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is my opinion that his condition of his knee
and the disability resulting from it is not
the result of the injury sustained in May of
1964." While this evidence might have
supported a conclusion that none of Berry's
disability could be attributed to his employment, the iSStle of industrial causation was
not before the board since this matter had
been determined favorably to Berry in the
1965 proceedings and was res judicata. If
a disability is established to be the result of
an industrial injury, a finding of apportionment between industrial and nonindustrial
causes cannot be supported by prior medical
testimony that the employee's disability was
entirely unconnected with his employment.
The board may rest a decision only on medical reports that are germane. (Jones v.
Workmen's Compo App. Bd. (1968) 68 A.C.
490, 494, 67 Ca!.Rptr. 544, 439 P.2d 648.)
The board noted in its opinion th~t Dr.
Parker related it was possible Berry :would
become considerably worse and ;might
eventually succumb to the disease. The
opinion states that in view of this evidence
it would be neither fair nor lawful t6 hold
the employer responsible for the preexisting
condition Hor the natural progress thereof,"
and that the conclusion on the issue of apportionment might be different if Berry's
disease could be cured so that he could be
restored to the same condition he was in
prior to his industrial injury or if his overw
all disability could be reduced by treatment.
[3] While these qualifying observations
indicate the board was reluctant to follow
the referee's recommendation because of
concern that failure to apportion would impose an onerous burden on the employer in
view of the permanence and seriousness of
Berry's illness, they do not establish that
apportionment is justified. In Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission (1946) 73 Ca!.App.2d 555, 166
P.2d 908, it was said, "It is now too well
settled in this state to require extended citation of authority that the employee is entitled to compensation for disability proximately caused by industrial injury regardless of whether the employee's condition at

the time of injury was average or subnormal. Thus, an aggravation of an existing
infirmity where such aggravation is proximately caused by the employment is com~
pensable, even though a normal man would
not have been adversely affected. This
rule applies even though it is shown that
the employee would have ultimately died
from such disease, if the evidence shows
and the commission finds that the inj ury
hastened or produced his death. (Sce many
cases collected 1 Campbell, Workmen's
Compensation, § 104, p. 80, particularly in
fn. 115.) Industry takes the employee as it
finds him. A person suffering from a preexisting disease who is disabled by an injury proximately arising out of the employment is entitled to compensation even
though a normal man would not have been
adversely affected by the event." (73 Cal.
App.2d at pp. 55S-559, 166 P.2d at p. 911.)
[4] The decision of the board is annulled and the cause is remanded to the
board for further proc~cdings consistent
with the views expressed herein.
TRAYNOR, C. J., and McCOMB, PETERS, TO BRINER, BURKE, and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur.
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Action by plaintiff for wrongful death
of child, for damages to the plaintiff be~
cause of emotional shock and physical injury and for damages on behalf of de-
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ceased's infant sister who witnessed fatal
accident allegedly caused by negligence of
defendant motorist. The Superior Court,
Sacramento County, Robert W. Cole, J.,
granted defendant motorist a summary
judgment on the mother's cause of action
for emotional shock and physical injury to
herself and the mother appealed. The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J., held that mother
asserting emotional trauma and physical
injury from the witnessing, in close proximity, of the death of her child as a result
of defendant motorist's negligent operation
of automobile alleged a sufficient prima
facie case against motorist.
Reversed.
Traynor, C. J" and Burke and McComb, JJ., dissented.

I. Damages (t;;)51

If defendant motorist were found not
liable for death of child because of contributory negligence of mother, sister or
deceased child, neither mother nor sister
who were close by should be allowed to
recover for emontional trauma they allegedly suffered in watching accident.
2. Damages

~51

Basis of claims for damages for emotional trauma sustained by third parties who
witnessed negligent act of defendant must
be the adjudicated liability and fault of defendant.

6. Damages

7. Damages

Possibility that some fraud will escape
detection does not justify abdication of judicial responsibility to award damages for
sound claims.
4. Damages

~52

Plaintiff claiming fear for his own
safety resulted in physical injury is a well
recognized case for recovery of damages.
5. Damages

8. Damages

~149

Mother's complaint asserting emotional
trauma and physical injury from the witnessing, in close proximity, of the death of
her child as a result of defendant motorist's
negligent operation of automobile alleged a
sufficient prima facie case against motorist.
~51

Damages may be recovered for emotional trauma and physical injury resulting
from plaintiff's witnessing of accident in
which closely related person is injured or
killed by negligent act of defendant if ordinary man should have foreseen 'injury to
plaintiff: overruling Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal.2d 295, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513.

~26

Law of torts holds defendant amenable
only for injuries to others which to defendant at time were reasonably foreseeable.
441 P.2d-58

~51

After consideration of the factors entering into determination of degree of defendant's foreseeability of injury to plaintiff from emotional shock as result,of witnessing a negligent act, court will,determine
whether accident and harm was reasonably
foreseeable which turns not on whether
particular defendant as individual would
have in actuality foreseen exact accident
and loss but whether ordinary man under
circumstances should reasonably have foreseen.

9. Damages
3. courts <S=>87

~51

In case of a shock resulting in physical
injury because of witncssing defendant's
ncgligent act toward another, 'in determining whether defendant should have reasonably foreseen injury to plaintiff or whether
defendant owed plaintiff duty 'of due care,
courts will consider: whether plaintiff was
located near scene of accident; whether
shock resulted from direct emotional impact
on plaintiff from sensory and contemporaneous observance of accident; and
whether plaintiff and victim were closely
related.

Bradford, Cross, Dahl & Hefner, Archie
Hefner and James M. Woodside, Sacramento, for plaintiffs and appellants.
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IVIcGregor, Bullen, Erich & McKone,
George Bullen and William C. McKinley,
Sacramento, 'for defendant and respondent.

TOBRINER, Justice.
That the ,courts should allow recovery
to a mother who suffers emotional trauma
and physical injury from witnessing the

infliction of death or injury to her child
for which the tort-feasor is liable in negligence would appear to be a compelling
proposition. As Prosser points Qut, HAll
ordinary human feelings are in favor of

her [the mother's] action against the negligent defendant. If a duty to her requires that she herself be in some recognizable danger, then it has properly been
said that when a child is endangered, it is
not beyond contemplation that its mother
will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will
suffer serious shock." (Prosser, Law of

Torts (3d ed. 1964) p.353.)
Nevertheless, past American decisions
have barred the mother's recovery. Refusing the mother the right to take her case
to the jury, these courts ground their position on an alleged absence of a required
"duty" of due care of the tortfeasor to the
mother. Duty, in turn, they state, must express public policy; the imposition of duty
here would work disaster because it would
invite fraudulent claims and it would involve the courts in the hopeless task of defining ,the extent of the tortfeasor's liability. In substance, they -say, definition
of liability being impossible, denial of liability is the only realistic alternative.
We have concluded that neither of the
feared dangers excuses the frustration of
the natural justice upon which the mother's
claim rests. We shall point out that in the
past we have rejected the argument that
we should deny recovery upon a legitimate
claim because other fraudulent ones may
be urged. We shall further explain that
the alleged inability to fix definitions for
recovery on the different facts of future
cases does not justify the denial of recovery
I.

......-~--------

For convenience, plaintiff will be used
in the singular to denote the mother,

on the specific facts of the instant case;
in any event, proper guidelines can indicate
the extent of liability for such future
cases.
In the instant case plaintiff's 1 first cause
of action alleged that on or about September 27, 1964, defendant drove his automobile
b a southerly direction on Bluegrass Road
near its intersection with Clover Lane in
the County of Sacramento, and at that time
plaintiff's infant daughter, Erin Lee Dillon,
lawfully crossed Bluegrass Road. The
complaint further alleged that defendant's
negligent operation of his vehicle caused
it to "collide with the deceased Erin Lee
Dillon resulting in injuries to decedent
which proximately resulted in her death."
(Complaint, p. 3.) Plaintiff, as the mother
of the decedent, brought an action for compensation for the loss.
Plaintiff's second cause of action alleged
that she, Margery M. Dillon, "was in close
proximity to the * * * collision and
personally witnessed said collision." She
further alleged that "because of the negligence of defendants * * * and as a
proximate cause [sic] thereof plaintiff
* * * sustained great emotional disturbance and shock and injury to her
nervous system" which caused her great
physical and mental pain and suffering.
Plaintiff's third cause of action alleged
that Cheryl Dillon, another infant daughter, was "in close proximity to the * * *
collision and personally witnessed said
collision."
Because of the negligence,
Cheryl Dillon "sustained great emotional
disturbance and shock and injury to her
nervous system," which caused her great
physical and mental pain and suffering.

On December 22, 1965, defendant, after
he had filed his answer, moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending that
"No cause of action is stated in that
allegation that plaintiff sustained emotional distress, fright or shock induced
by apprehension of negligently caused
although n minor sister is joined as plaintiff.
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danger or injury or the witnessing of
negligently caused injury to a third person. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply
Co., 59 Ca1.2d 295, 29 Ca1.Rptr. 33, 379
P.2d 513 (1963). Even where a child,
sister or spouse is the object of the plaintiff's apprehension no cause of action is
stated, Supra, p. 303, 29 Ca1.Rptr. 33,
379 P.2d 513, unless the complaint alleges
that the plaintiff suffered emoti<onal distress, fright or shock as a result of fear
for his own safety. Reed v. Moore, 156
Cal.App.2d 43 (1957) at page 45 [319 P.2d
80]." (Italics added.) The court granted
a judgment on the pleadings against the
mother's count, the second cause of action,
and denied it as to the sister's count, the
third cause of action. The court, further,
dismissed the second cause of action.
Margery M. Dillon, the mother appealed
from that judgment.
Thereafter, on January 26, further proceedings took place as to the third cause
of action, Cheryl Dillon's claim for emotional trauma from witnessing her sister's
death while "watching her sister lawfully
cross Bluegrass Road."
Defendant moved for summary judgment on this count. In opposition plaintiff contended that the declaration of one
McKinley disclosed that Mrs. Dillon testified at her deposition that when she saw
the car rolling over Erin she noted that
Cheryl was on the curb, but that the
deposition of Cheryl Dillon contradicts
such statements. Plaintiff therefore submitted that HSince the declarations filed
by defendant are contradictory and the
testimony contained in the testimony of
Mrs. Dillon does not establish as a matter
of law that Cheryl Dillon was not in the
zone of danger or had fear for her own
safety, plaintiff respectfully submits that
the motion must be denied."
The court denied the motion for summary judgment on the third cause as to
Cheryl on the ground that the pretrial
order precluded it. The trial court" apparently sustained the motion for judgment
on the pleadings on the second cause as

to the mother because she was not within
the zone of danger and denied that motion
as to the third cause involving Cheryl
because of the possibility that she was
within such zone of danger or feared for
her own safety. Thus we have before us
a case that dramatically illustrates the
difference in result flowing from the
alleged requirement that a plaintiff cannot
recover for emotional trauma in witnessing the death of a child or sister unless
she also feared for her own safety because
she was actually within the zone of physical impact.
The posture of this case differs from
that of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 298, 29
Cal.Rptr. 33, 35, 379 P.2d 513, 515, which
involved Hfright or nervous shock (with
consequent bodily illness) induced solely
by * * * apprehension of negligently
caused danger or injury to a third person"
because the complaint here presents the
claim of the emotionally traumatized
mother, who admittedly was not within
the zone of danger, as contrasted with
that of the sister, who may have been
within it. The case thus illustrates the
fallacy of the rule that would deny recovery
in the one situation and grant it in the
other. In the first place, we can hardly
justify relief to the sister for trauma which
she suffered upon apprehension of the
child's death and yet deny it to the mother
merely because of a happenstance that the
sister was some few yards closer to the
accident. The instant case exposes the
hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger
rule. In the second place, to rest upon the
zone-of-danger rule when we have rejected
the impact rule becomes even less defensible. We have, indeed, held that impact is
not necessary for recovery (Cook v. Maier
(1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 581,584,92 P.2d 434.)
The zone-of-danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse because the only reason for
the requirement of presence in that zone
lies in the fact that one within it will fear
the danger of impact. At the threshold,
then, we point to the incongruity of the
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rules upon which any rejection of plaintiff's
recovery must rest.
[1,2] We further note, at the outset,
that defendant has interposed the defense
that the contributory negligence of the
mother, the sister, and the child contributed
to the accident. I f any such defense is
sustained and defendant found not liable for
the death of the child because of the contributory negligence of the mother, sister
or child, we do not believe that the mother
or sister should recover for the emotional
trauma which they allegedly suffered. In
the absence of the primary liability of the
tort-feasor for the death of the child, we
see no ground for an independent and secondary liability for claims for injuries by
third parties. The basis for such c1aims
must be adjudicated liability and fault of
defendant; that liability and fault must
be the foundation for the tort-feasor's duty
of due care to third parties who, as a
consequence of such negligence, sustain
emotional trauma.
We turn then to an analysis of the
concept of duty, which, as we have stated,
has furnished the ground for th~ rejection
of such claims as the instant one. 'Normally
the simple facts of plaintiff's complaint
would establish a cause of action: the
complaint alleges that defendant drove his
car (I) negligently, as a (2) proximate
result of which plaintiff suffered (3)
physical injury. Proof of these facts
to a jury leads to recovery in damages;
indeed, such a showing represents a classic
example of the type of accident with which
the law of negligence 'has been designed
to deal.
2. "rl'he gradual development of the law in
the matter of civil Jiability is discussed
and traced by the late Sir William Holdsworth with ample learning and lucidity
in his History 'of English Luw, vol. 8,
pp. 446 et seq., and need not here be rehearsed. Suffice it to say that the process of evolution has been from the principle that every man acts at his peril and
is liable for all the consequcnccs of his
ncts to the principle that a man's freedom of action is ,subject only to the ob-

The assertion that liability must nevertheless be denied because defendant bears
no "duty" to plaintiff "begs the essential
question-whether the plaintiff's interests
are entitled to legal protection against
the defendant's conduct. * * * It
[duty1 is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis
in itself. * * * But it should be recognized that 'duty' is not sacrosanct in
itself, but only an expression of the sum
total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection."
(Prosser, Law of Torts, supra, at pp.
332-333.)
The history of the concept of duty in
itself discloses that it is not an old and
deep-rooted doctrine but a legal device
of the latter half of the nineteenth century
designed to curtail the feared propensities
of juries toward liberal awards. "It must
not be forgotten that 'duty' got into our
law for the very purpose of combatting
what was then feared to be a dangerous
delusion (perhaps especially prevalent
among juries imbued with popular notions
of fairness untempered by paramount
judicial policy), viz. that the law might
countenance legal redress for all foreseeable harm." (Fleming, An Introduction
to the Law of Torts (1967) p. 47.)
Indeed, the idea of court-imposed restrictions on recovery by means of the
concept of "duty" contrasted dramatically
with the preceding legal system of feudal
society.2 In the enclosed feudal society,
the actor bore responsibility for any damage he inflicted without regard to whether
he was at fault or owed a "duty" to the
ligation not to infringe any duty of care
which he owes to others. The emphasis
formerly was on the injury sustained and
the question was whether the case fell
within one of the accepted classes of common law actions; the emphasis now is
on the conduct of the person whose act
has occasioned the injury and the question is whether it can be characterized as
negligent." (Read v. J. Lyons & Co.,
Ltd. (1947) A.C. 156, 171.)
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injured person. Thus, at that time, the
defendant owed a duty to all the world
to conduct himself without causing injury
to his fellows. It may well be that the
physical contraction of the feudal society
imposed an imperative for maximum
procurable safety and a corresponding absolute responsibility upon its members.
The Industrial Revolution, which cracked
the solidity of the feudal society and
opened up wide and new areas of expansion, changed the legal concepts. Just
as the new competitiveness in the economic
sphere figuratively broke out of the walls
of the feudal community, so it broke
through· the rule of strict liability. In the
place of strict liability it introduced the
theory that an action for negligence would
lie only if the defendant breached a duty
which he owed to plaintiff. As Lord
Esher said in Le Lievre v. Gould (1893)
1 Q.B. 491, 497: "A man is entitled to
be as negligent as he pleases towards the
whole world if he owes no duty to them."
We have pointed out that this late 19th
century concept of duty, as applied to the
instant situation, has led the courts to
deny liability. We have noted that this
negation of duty emanates from the twin
fears that courts will be flooded with an
onslaught of (1) fraudulent and (2) indefinable claims. \Ve shall point out why
we think neither fear justified.

This court in the past has rejected
the argument that we must deny
recovery upon a legitimate claim because other fraudulent ones may be
urged.
The denial of "duty" in the instant situation n:sts upon the prime hypothesis that
allowance of such an action would lead to
successful assertion of fraudulent claims.
(See, e. g., Waube v. Warrington (1935)
216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.w. 497.) The
rationale apparently assumes that juries,
1.

3. To the extent that this argument shade~
into the contention that such claims'
should be denied because otherwise courts
would experience a "flood of litigation,"
we point out that courts are responsible

confronted by irreconcilable expert medical
testimony, will be unable to distinguish the
deceitful from the bona fide. The argument concludes that only a per se rule
denying the entire class of claims that potentially raises this administrative probtern 3 can avoid this danger.
In the first instance, the argument proceeds from a doubtful factual assumption.
Whatever the possibilities of fraudulent
claims of physical injury by disinterested
spectators of an accident, a question not
in issue in this case, we certainly cannot
doubt that a mother who sees her child
killed will suffer physical injury from
shock. HIt seems sufficiently obvious that
the shock of a mother at danger or harm
to her child may be both a real and a serious injury." (Prosser, Law of Torts,
supra, at p. 353.)
Over a half-century ago this court recognized the likelihood that such fright and
fear would cause physical injury. In
Sloane v .. Southern California Ry. Co.
(1896) 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 322, we
affirmed a Judgment for damages for a
plaintiff who alleged physical injury resulting from mental suffering, saying:
HIt is a matter of general knowledge that
an attack of sudden fright or an exposure
to imminent peril has produced in individuals a complete change in their nervous
system, and rendered one who was physically strong and vigorous weak and timid."
Since no one can seriously question that
fear or grief for one's child is as likely to
cause physical injury as concern over one's
own well-being, rejection of the fraudulent
claims contention in Sloane clearly applies
here.
In the second instance, and more fundamentally, the possibility that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated
cases does not justify a wholesale rejection
of the entire class of claims in which that
for dealing with cases on their merits,
whether there be few suits or many; the
existence of n multitude of claims merely shows society's pressing need for leg,ll
redress.
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potentiality arises. The ('contention that
the rule permitting the maintenance of the
action would be impractical to administer
* '" '" is but an argument that the courts

are incapable of performing their appointed
tasks, a premise which has frequently been
rejected." (Emden v. Vitz (1948) 88 Cal.
App.2d 313, 319, 198 P.2d 696, 700.)
"[F]ear that unfounded claims may be put
forward, and may result in erroneous conclusions of fact, ought not to influence us
to impose legal 1imitations as to the nature
of the facts that it is permissible to prove."

(Owens v. Liverpool Corp. (1939) 1 K.B.
394, 400.) "Certainly it is a very q~estion
able position for a court to take, that because of the possibility of encouraging
fictitious claims compensation should be
denied those who have actually suffered
serious inj ury through the negligence of
another." (Orlo v. Connecticut Co. (1941)

128 Conn. 231,239, 21 A.2d 402, 405. See
also Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Area
of Risk (1953) 16 Modern L.Rev. 14, 23;
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, supra,

34 Harv.L.Rev. 260, 276.)
On the analogous issue of whether the
possibility of collusive fraud in intrafamily
tort actions justified a per se rule denying
recovery in all such cases, this court held
that the interests of meritorious plaintiffs
should prevail over alleged administrative

difficulties.

Upholding the claim of a mi-

nor child in that situation we said: "The
interest of the child in freedom from personal injury_caused by the tortious conduct
of others is sufficient to outweigh any danger of fraud or collusion. * * * [T]he
fact that there may be greater opportunity
for fraud or collusion in one class of cases
than another does not warrant courts of law

in closing the door to all cases of that class.
Conrts must depend upon the efficacy of the
judicial processes to ferret out the meritorious from the fraudulent in particular

cases." (Emery v. Emery (1955) 45 Cal.2d
421, 431, 289 P.2d 218, 224; see also Klein
4. California's rule that plaintiff's fear for
his own safety is compensable also pre-

v. Klein (1962) 58 Cal.2d 692, 695-696, 26
Cal.Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70.)
[3]

The possibility that some fraud will

escape detection does ~ot justify an abdication of the judical responsibility to award
damages for sound claims: if it is "to be
conceded that our procedural system for the
ascertainment of truth is inadequate to defeat fraudulent claims * * *, the result
is a virtual acknowledgment that the courts
are unable to render justice in respect to
them."
(Chiuchiolo v. New England

Wholesale Tailors (1930) 84 N.H. 329, 335,
150 A. 540, 543.)
Indubitably juries and trial courts, constantly called upon to distinguish the frivolous from' the substantial and the fraudulent from the meritorious, reach some
erroneous results. But such fallibility, inherent in the judicial process, offers no reason for substituting for the case-by-case
resolution of causes an artificial and indefensible barrier. Courts not only compromise their basic responsibility to decide the
merits of each case individually but destroy
the public's confidence in them by using the
broad broom of "administrative convenience" to sweep away a class of claims a
number of which are admittedly meritorious.
The mere assertion that fraud is possible,
"a possibility [that] exists to some degree in

all cases" (Klein v. Klein, supra, 58 CaI.2d
692, 695, 26 Cal.Rptr. 102, 104, 376 P.2d 70,
72), does not prove a present necessity to
abandon the neutral principles of foreseeability, proximate cause and consequential
injury that generally govern tort law.

[4]

Indeed, we doubt that the problem

of the fraudulent claim is substantially
more pronounced in the case of a mother
claiming physical injury resulting from

seeing her child killed than in other areas
of tort law in which the right to recover
damages is well established in California.
For exaIPple, a plaintiff claiming that fear
for his own safety resulted in physical injury makes out a well recognized case for

recovery.'

(Lindley v. Knowlton (1918)

sents n strong argument for the same rule
as to fear for others; otherwise, some
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179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440; Webb v. Francis
Lewald Coal Co. (1931) 214 Cal. 182,4
P.2d 532;
Vanoni v. Western Airlines
(1967) 247 Cal.App.2d 793, 56 CaI.Rptr..
115.) Moreover, damages are allowed for
"mental suffering," a type of injury, on the
whole, less amenable to objective proof than
the physical injury involved here; the rnental injury can be in aggravation of, or
"parisitic to," an established tort. (Sloane
v. Southern California Ry. Co., supra, 111
Cal. 668, 44 P. 320; Acadia, California,
Ltd. v. Herbert (1960) 54 Cal.2d 328, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 686, 353 P.2d 294; Easton v. United
Trade School Contracting Co. (1916) 173
Cal. 199, 159 P. 597.) In fact, fear for another, even in the absence of resulting physical injury, can be part of these parisitic
damages. (Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert, supra, 54 Cal.2d 328, 337, 5 Cal.Rptr.
686, 353 P.2d 29-1; Easton v. United Trade
School Contracting Co., supra, 173 Cal. 199,
202, 159 P. 597.) And emotional distress,
if inflicted intentionally, constitutes an independent tort. (State Rubbish Collectors
Ass'n v. Siliznoff (1952) 38 Cal.2d 330,
338, 2-10 P.2d 282.) The danger of plaintiffs' fraudulent collection of damages for
nonexistent injury is at least as great in
these examples as in the instant case.

J.

irate customer (I de S et ux v. W de S, Y.B.
22 Edw. iii, f. 99, pI. 60 (1348)), defendants
have argued that plaintiffs' claims of injury
from emohonal trauma might well be
fraudulent. Yet we cannot let the difficulties of adjudication frustrate the principIc that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong.

2.

The alleged inability to fix definitions for recovery on the different
facts of future cases does not justify
the denial of recover'}' on the specific
facts of the instant case; in any
event, proper gu£delines can indicate
the extent of liability for such future
cases.

[5] In order to limit the otherwise potential infinite liability which would follow
every negligent act, the law of torts holds
defendant amenable only for inj uries to
others which to defendant at the time were
reasonably foreseeable.

In sum, the application of tort law can
never be a matter of mathematical precision. In terms of characterizing conduct
as tortious and matching a money award
to the injury suffered as well as in fixing
the extent of injury, the process cannot be
perfect. Undoubtedly, ever since the ancient case of the tavern-keeper's wife who
successfully avoided the hatchet cast by an

In the absence of "overriding policy considerations * * * foreseeability of risk
[is] of * * * primary importance in
establishing the element of duty." (Grafton
v. Mol1ica (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 860, 865,
42 Cal.Rptr. 306, 310. See also McEvoy v.
American Pool Corp. (19-18) 32 Ca1.2d 295,
195 P.2d 783; Hergenrether v. East (1961)
61 Cal.2d 440, 39 Ca1.Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 16-1.)
As a classic opinion states: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed." (Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.
Co. (1928) 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99,
100.) Defendant owes a duty, in the sense
of a potential liability for damages, only
with respect to those risks or hazards whose

lllaintiffs will falsely claim to have feared
for themselves, and the honest parties
unwilling to do so will be penalized. (Cf.
2 Harper & .James, The Law of Torts
(1956) § 16.15, p. 961.) Moreover, it is
incongruous and somewhat revolting to
sanction recovery for the mother if she
suffers shock from fear for her own safety and to deny it for shock from the witnessed death of her own daughter. rro
the layman such a ruling must appear
incomprehensible; for the courts to rely
upon self-contradictory legalistic abstractions to justify it is indefensible. 'Ye

concur with Judge Magruder's observation in 49 Harvard Law Review 1033,
at IHlge 1039: "Once accepting the view
t1mt [l plaintiff threatened with fID injurious impact may recover for bodily harm
resulting from shock without imlluct, it
is easy to agree with Atkin, L.J. «(Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., [1925] '1 KB.
141, 158-159]), tlmt to hinge recovery
on the speculative issue wlleth~r the
parent was Shocked through feur for het'self or for her children 'would be (liscreditable to any system of jurisprudence.' "

920

Cal.

441 PACIFIO REPORTER, 2d SERIES

likelihood made the conduct unreasonably
dangerous,' 'and hence negligent, in the first
instance. (See Keeton, Legal Cause in the
Law of Torts (1963) 18-20; Seavey, Mr.
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts
(1939) 52 Harv.L.Rev. 372; Seavey, Principles of Torts (1942) 56 Harv.L.Rev. 72.)
Harper and James state the prevailing
view. The obligation turns on whether
"the offending conduct foreseeabIy involved
unreasonably great risk of harm to the interests of someone other than the actor.
* * * [T]he obligation to refain from
* * * particular conduct is owed only to
those who are foreseeably endangered by
the conduct and only with respect to those
risks or hazards whose likelihood made the
conduct unreasonably dangerous. Duty, in
other words, is measured by the scope of
the risk which negligent conduct foreseeably entails." (2 Harper & James, The
Law of Torts, supra, at p. 1018; fns. omitted.)
This foreseeable risk may be of two types.
The first ciass involves actual physical impact. A second type of risk applies to the
instant situation. "In other cases, however,
plaintiff is outside the zone of physical risk
(or there is no risk of physical impact at
all), but bodily injury or sickness is brought
on by emotional disturbance which in turn
is caused by defendant's conduct. Under
general principles recovery should be had
in such a case if defendant should foresee
fright or shock severe enough to cause substantial injury in a person normally constituted. Plaintiff would then be within the
zone of risk in very much the same way
as are plaintiffs to whom danger is extended by acts of third persons, or forces of
nature, or their own responses (where these
things are foreseeable)." (2 Harper &
5. The concept of the zone of danger cannot properly be restricted to the area of
those exposed to ph11sical injury; it
Illu'>t encompass the area of those eXposed to emoUonal injury. The courts,
today, hold that no distinction can be
drawn between physical injury and emotional injury flowing from the physical
lDJury; indeed, in the light of modern
medical knowledge, any such distinction

James, The Law of Torts, supra, at pp.
1035-1036; fns. omitted.)"
Since the chief element in determining
whether defendant owes a duty or an obligation to plaintiff is the foreseeability of
the risk, that factor will be of prime concern in every case. Because it is inherently
intertwined with foreseeability such duty
or obligation must necessarily be adjudicated only upon 'a case-by-case basis. We
cannot now predetermine defendant's obligation in every situation by a fixed category; no immutable rule can establish the
extent of that obligation for every circumstance of the future. We can, however,
define guidelines which will aid in the resolution of such an issue as the instant one.
[6] We note, first, that we deal here
with a case in which plaintiff suffered a
shock which resulted in physical injury and
we confine our ruling to that case. In determining, in such a case, whether defendant should reasonably foresee the injury
to plaintiff, or, in other terminology,
whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty
of due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the following: (1)
Whether plaintiff was located near the
scene of the accident as contrasted with one
who was a distance away from it. (2)
Whether the shock resulted from a direct
emotional impact upon plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its
occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the
victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the
presence of only a distant relationship.
The evaluation of these factors will indicate the degree of the defendant's forewould be indefensible. As a result, in
awarding recovery for emotional shock
upon witnessing another's injury or
denth, we cannot draw a line between the
plaintiff who is in the zone of danger of
physical impact and the plaintiff who is
in the zone of danger of emotional impact. The recovery of the one, within
the guidelines set forth infra, is as much
compelled as that of the other.
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seeability: obviously defendant is more
likely to foresee that a mother who observes an accident affecting her child will
suffer harm than to foretell that a stranger
witness will do so. Similarly, the degree
of foreseeability of the third person's injury is far greater in the case of his COntemporaneous observance of the accident
than that in which he subsequently learns
of it. The defendant is mOTC likely to foresee that shock to the nearby, witnessing
mother will cause physical harm than to
anticipate that someone distant from the
accident will suffer more than a temporary
emotional reaction. All these elements, of
course, shade into each other; the fixing of
obligation, intimately tied into the facts, depends upon each case.
[7] In light of these factors the court
will determine whether the accident and
harm was reasonably foreseeable. Such
reasonable foreseeability does not turn on
whether the particular defendant as an individual would have in actuality foreseen
the exact accident and loss j it contemplates
that courts, on a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide
what the ordinary man under such circumstances should reasonably have foreseen.
The courts thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unexpected.
[8] In the instant case, the presence of
all the above factors indicates that plaintiff has alleged a sufficient prima facie
Case. Sur~ly the negligent driver who
causes the death of a young child may reasonably expect that the mother will not be
far distant and will upon witnessing the
accident suffer emotional trauma. As Dean
Prosser has stated: "when a child is endangered, it is not beyond contemplation
that its mother will be somewhere in the
vicinity, and will suffer serious shock."
(Prosser, The Law of Torts, supra, at p.
353. See also 2 Harper & James, The Law
of Torts, supra, at p. 1039.)
We are not now called upon to decide
whether, in the absence or reduced weight
of some of the above factors, we would con441

P.2d-56V~

elude that the accident and injury were not
reasonably foreseeable and that therefore
defendant owed no duty of due care to
plaintiff. In future cases the courts will
draw lines of demarcation upon facts more
subtle than the compelling ones alleged in
the complaint before us.
The coltrts have in the past, in analogous
situations, drawn the limits of liability, applying general guidelines such as those
above set forth to the specific facts of the
cases. As examples of that process of definition we set forth the history of the Hopen
car" cases, the rulings on recovery by persons not in privity of contract for defendant's negligence in drafting instrnments,
the decisions on the intentional infliction
of emotional injury, the modern English
cases, and some illustrative opinions that
adjudicate the specific issue before us.
The ability of courts to limit liability
predicated on tests largely based upon foreseeability is well illustrated by the "open
car" cases. The p~ototype case is the suit
against the owner of a vehicle for damage
caused plaintiff by a third party who can
commandeer the vehicle because of the
owner's carelessness in leaving the keys inside. In Richardson v. Ham (1955) 44 Cal.
2d 772, 285 P.2d 269, we posited liability on
the owner of a bulldozer because of a
"foreseeable risk of intermeddling" (p. 776,
285 P.2d 269), noting especially the great
danger the bulldozer created and the special
temptation it presented to third parties.
Similarly, in Hergenrether v. East, supra,
61 Cal.2d 440. 39 Cal.Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164,
we upheld sttch liability of a truck owner on
the basis of Hgreater potentiality of foreseeable risk" (p. 444, 39 Cal.Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d
16-1) because of the possible danger of the
vehicle, the time for which it was unattended, and the type of persons who frequent the neighborhood in which it was left.
These decisions have not led to untrammeled liability. Rather, applying the foreseeability test, the courts have held that the
mere act of leaving a key in an automobile,
although it may possibly raise a foreseeable
risk that the car will be stolen, does not in-
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crease the risk of injury to other property
and hence' does not warrant liability:
"[e]ven if she could have foreseen the
theft, she had no reason to believe that the
thief would be an incompetent driver."
(Richards v.,.Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60,
66, 271 P.2d 23, 27.) In short, "each ca~
must be considered on its own facts to determine whether the [situation] in toto justifies the conclusion that the foreseeable
risk of harm imposed is unreasonable, and
that the defendant owner or one in charge
of a vehicle has a duty to third persons in
the class of the plaintiffs to refrain from
subjecting them' to such risk." (Hergenrether v. East, Sllpra, 61 Cal.2d 440, 445, 39
Cal.Rptr. 4, 7, 393 P.2d 164, 167; see also
England v. Mapes Produce Co. (1965) 238
Cal.App.2d 120, 47 Cal.Rptr. 506; Murray
v. Wright (1958) 166 Cal.App.2d 589, 333
P.2d 111.)
In another category of cases, those involving the liability of a tortfeasor to a
third person with whom he was not in
privity of contract for negligent draftmanship of a legal document, we have recognized
the right of the injured party to compensation and s~t out guidelines for the determination of future cases. In Lucas v.
Hamm (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 583, 588, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685, we applied this rule
to an attorney who drew a defective will,
thereby causing damage to the intended
third-party beneficiary. (See also Biakanja
v. Irving (1958) -19 Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d
16.)
In sanctioning recovery for injury caused
by intentional infliction of mental distress,
this court did not defer to the argument
that liability should not be imposed because
of the possible future difficulty in delimiting the area of liability. Defendants urged
that if recovery were to be allowed for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
actions would soon be forthcoming based
upon every minor personal insult or :indignity. We said: "That administrativ',e difficulties do not justify the denial of :relief
for serious invasions of mental and', emotional tranquility is demonstrated by the

cases recognizing the right of privacy."
(State Rubbish etc. Ass'n v. Siliznoff, supra, 38 Cal.2d 330, 338, 240 P.2d 282, 286.)
We rejected the contention "that to allow
recovery in the absence of physical injury
will open the door to unfounded claims and
a flood of litigation, and that the requirement that there be physical injury is necessary to insure that serious mental suffering
actually occurred" (State Rubbish etc. Ass'n
v. Siliznoff, supra, 38 Cal.2d 330, 338, 240
P.2d 282, 286).
Indeed, the argument that Hthere is no
point at which such actions would stop" is
no more plausible today than when it was
advanced in \Vinterbottom v. Wright (18-12)
10 M. & W. 109, 111. History has exposed
the fallacy of the claim that abolition of
privity in enterprise liability cases would
lead to Hthe most absurd and outrageous
conseqnences, to which I can see no limit"
(p. 114). In taking another giant step forward, in imposing product liability in tort,
we were not halted by the spectre of an inability to pre-judge every futnre case. The
setting of boundaries upon that doctrine
makes the problem of fixing lines of limitation here appear, by comparison, almost
miniscule. The widening of the area of liability and the possibility of the encouragement of unfounded and indefinable claims
in the products liability field was sweeping:
here we deal with a comparatively isolated
and unusual situation. We do not believe
that the fear that we cannot sllccessfll1iy
adjudicate future cases of this sort, pursuant
to the suggested guidelines: should bar recovery in an otherwise meritorious cause.
The fear of an inability to fix boundaries
has not impelled the conrts of England to
deny recovery for emotional trauma caused
by witnessing the death or injury of another
dne to defendant's negligence. We set forth
the holdings of some English cases merely
to demonstrate that courts can formulate
and apply such limitations of liability.
The first and classic case, Hambrook v.
Stokes Bros., supra 1 K.B. 141, rejected the
argument that recovery should be denied
because of possible administrative dif-
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ficulty. In Hambrook the defendant's servant left a truck parked at the top of a steep
and narrow street with the engine running.
The deceased, a pregnant woman, had walkcd with her children on their way to school
to the point where they turned onto the
street where the truck was parked. Because
the driver did not take proper precautions,
the truck started itself down the hill and
struck onc of the children. Although she
herself was never in danger, the mother
saw the runaway truck and feared greatly
for the safety of her children. Upon inquiry she found that one of the children
had been seriously injured j several months
later both the mother and the foetus were
dead. The trial court directed the jury that
the father's suit for loss of services could
succeed 'only if the death were caused by
the mother's fear for her own safety, but
the appellate court held that the plaintiff
could recover even if the fear for the children brought about her demise.
Faced with the contention that their holding would increase the number of suits and
foment possible fraudulent claims, Lord
Justice Atkin quoted this passage: "'I
should be sorry to adopt a rule which would
bar all such claims on grounds of policy
alone, and in order to prevent the possible
success of unrighteous or groundless actions. Such a course involves the denial of
redress in meritorious cases, and it necessarily implies a certain degree of distrust,
which I do not share, in the capacity of
legal tribunals to get at the truth in this
class of claim.'" (Hambrook v. Stokes
Bros., supra, quoting from Dttlieu v. White
and Sons [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 681, opinion
by Kennedy, J.)
I n a recent application of the H ambrook
rule, an English court permitted recovery
by a widow of a man who developed severe
psychoneurotic symptoms as a result of harrowing experiences, not involving his personal safety, white serving as a rescuer at
a gruesome train wreck The court stated
that the H ltest of liability for shock is foreseeability of injury by shock.''' (Chadwick
v. British Railways Board [1967] 1 W.L.R.

912. 920, quoting from King v. PhiIlips
[1953] 1 Q.B. 429, 441, opinion by Denning,
L.J.)
Professor John Fleming of the School of

Law, Boalt Hall, University of California,
in a careful analysis of the '~evelopment of
English law on this subject, first explains,
HIt is evident, of course, that to the extent
of denying redress for certain kinds of negligently inflicted harm, the law is in effect
withholding its protective mantle from corresponding human interests that may accordingly be infringed with impunity. To
refuse a remedy for nervous shock is the
equivalent of refusing to accede to an individual's claim for safeguarding his emotional security. It is also the same as saying
that there is no 'duty' owed to exercise
reasonable care to avoid inflicting this type
of loss or injury. Although no longer
quite as fashionable in this particular context, the same idea can also, finally, be expressed by asserting that such damage is
'too remote' or, what amounts to the same
thing, that the defendant's negligence was
not its 'proximate cause'." (Fleming, An
Introduction to the Law of Torts (1967)
p. 46.)
After explaining that certain English
cases manipulated doctrinal approaches "to
subserve ulterior purposes" in granting recovery in some situations and denying it in
others, Fleming states that "a long-delayed
change in attitude may perhaps be discerned
in the latest decision by the Court of Appeal
[Boardman v. Sanderson (1964) 1 W.L.R.
1317 (C.A.)], which sustained a father's
claim for a mental shock he suffered upon
hearing the screams of his boy when the
latter's foot was negligently caught under
the wheel of the defendant's car from which
father and son had just alighted inside a
service garage. Neither did the father fear
for his own, safety nor did he so much as
even see the accident. Indeed, the claimant
was not even a. female-the prototype plaintiff in these cases being almost exclusively
concerned with pregnancy injuries. Yet
the court considered it sufficient to say that
a duty was owed not only to the boy but
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also to ~is near relatives, who, to the defendant's kn'owledge, were on the premises
within earshot and likely to come upon the
scene if any injury befell him. It remains
to be seen whether this relaxation, slight
as it may be, might not eventually be extended to relatives whose presence, though not
actually known, was yet foreseeable in accordance with the prevailing test customarily applied to claims for physical injuries." (Italics in original; fn. omitted.)
(Fleming, An Introduction to the Law of
Torts, supra, at p. 54.)
The English courts have likewise marked
out areas of liability, excluding those injuries that are remote and unexpected.
Thus a distinguished English court has held
that the physical injury of a casual bystander resulting from shock or fright upon witnessing an accident would present so unusual and hence unforeseeable an event as to
warrant a directed verdict for defendant.
"The driver of a car or vehicle, even though
careless, is entitled to assume that the ordinary frequenter of the streets has sufficient
fortitude to endure such incidents as may
from time to time be expected to occur in
them, including the noise of a collision and
the sight of injuries to others, and is not to
be considered negligent towards one who
does not possess the customary phlegm."
(Italics added.) (Bourhill v. Young (1943)
A.C. 92, 117 (Porter, L.J.); see, id. at pp. 98
(Thankerton, L.J.), 101 (Russel!, L.J.), 104
(MacMillan, L.J.), and 107 (Wright, L.J.);
King v; Phillips, supra, 1 Q.B. 429, 442.)
Thus we see no
general rules of tort
cepts of negligence,
foreseeability, long

good reason why the
law, including the conproximate cause, and
applied to all other

6. In Lindley a l65-pound chimpanzee had
entered plaintiff's house and attacked
her children, whom she rescued from it.
The court recognized that the ('oncern
of the mother for the safety of the children as well us conccrn for her own safety
could have contributed to her fright. It
states: "\Vhile, of course, Mrs. Lindley
wns grently and perhaps chiefly concerned for her children * * * there is
nothing in the testimony to indicate that
she was not concerned for. her own

types of injury, should not govern the case
now before us. Any questions that the
cause raises "will be solved most justly by
applying general principles of duty and
negligence, and
* mechanical rules
of thumb which are at variance with these
principles do more harm than good." . (2
Harper & James, The Law of Torts, supra,
p. 1039; fn. omitted.) "The refusal to apply these general rules to actions for this
particular kind of physical injury is nothing
short of a denial of justice." (Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 Harv.L.
Rev. 260, Z77; fn. omitted.)

* *

In short, the history of the cases does not
show the development of a logical rule but
rather a series of changes and abandonments. Upon the argument in each sitnation that the courts' draw a Maginot Line
to withstand an onslaught of false claims,
the cases have assumed a variety of postures. At first they insisted that there be
no recovery for emotional trauma at all.
(Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,
supra, S9 Ca1.2d 295, dissenting opinion by
Peters, J., p. 328 fn. 9, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379
P.2d 513.) Retreating from this position,
they gave relief for such trauma only if
physical impact occurred. (Id. at p. 325 fn.
4, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513.) They
then abandoned the requirement for physical impact but insisted that the victim fear
for her own safety (Amaya v. Home Ice,
Fuel & Supply Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d 295,
29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513), holding that
a mother could recover for fear for her
children's safety if she simultaneously entertained a personal fear for herself.
(Lindley v. Knowlton, supra, 179 Cal. 298,
176 P. 440.) 6 They stated that the mother
safety."

(179 Cal. 302, 176 P. p. 441.)
As a basis for reversal of plaintiff's v(>rdict defendant nrg(>d thnt the court should
have instru<'ted the jury thnt "no rpcovery may be had on account of fright
produced by n})lll·phcndcd tl:mgt.'r or peril
to a third IH'I'Son." The court affirmcil.
saying that the ('iT('ulllstnnces made "it
impossiblc that she should have been ilt'void of fenr for herself" and that th<'
instruction was therefore properly refused. Hence the court in substance sus-
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need only be in the "zone of danger" (Reed
v. Moore (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 43, 47, 319
P.2d 80). The final anomaly would be the
instant case in which the sister, who observed the accident, would be granted recovery because she was in the "zone of
danger," but the mother, not far distant,
would be barred from recovery.

tury which can claim no current credence.
No good reason compels our captivity to an
indefensible orthodoxy.
The judgment is reversed.

The successive abandonment of these
positions exposes the weakness of artificial
abstractions which bar recovery contrary to
the general rules. Ar:. the commentators
have suggested, the problem should be
solved by the application of the principles
of tort, not by the creation of exceptions to
them. Legal history shows that artificial
islands of exceptions, created from the fear
that the legal process will not work, usually
do not withstand the waves of reality and,
in time, descend into oblivion.

DISSENTING OPINION

[9] We have explained that recovery
here will not expose the courts to false
claims or a flood of litigation. The test
that we have set forth will aid in the proper
resolution of future cases. Indeed, the general principles of tort law are acknowledged
to work successfully in all other cases of
emotional trauma.
Yet for some artificial reason this delimitation of-liability is alleged to be unworkable in the most egregious case of
them all: the mother's emotional trauma
at the witnessed death of her child. If we
stop at this point, however, we must necessarily question and reject not merely recovery here, but the viability of the judicial
process for ascertaining liability for tortious conduct itself. To the extent that it is
inconsistent with our ruling here, we therefore overrule Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel &
Supply Co., supra, 59 Cal.2d 295, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513.
To deny recovery would be to chain this
state to an outmoded rule of the 19th centnined recovery for fright based upon a
combination of fears, those arising from
fear of the mother for the children as
well as for herself.

Amaya the trial court sustained a
general demurrer to the complaint and

I. In

PETERS, MOSK, and SULLIVAN,
concur.

JJ.,

TRAYNOR, Chief Justice.
I dissent for the reasons set forth in
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.
(1963) 59 Cal.2d 295, 297-315, 29 Cal.
Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513. In my opinion
that case was correctly decided and should
not be overruled.
DISSENTING OPINION
BURKE, Justice.
As recently as 1963 this court, in Amaya
v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal.
2d 295, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513,
thoroughly studied and expressly rejected
the proposition (pp. 298-299, 29 Cal.Rptr.
33, 379 P.2d 513) that tort liability may be
predicated on fright or nervous shock (with
consequent bodily illness) induced solely
by the plaintiff's apprehension of negligently caused danger or injury to a third
person. As related in our Amaya opinion,
plaintiff there was the mother of a 17month-old boy who saw him struck by a
truck; accordingly our ruling necessarily
included all mothers of small children who
observe them being injured. Yet today
this court's Amaya decision is overruled by
an opinion which disdains any discussion
whatever of the history and policy of pertinent law painstakingly set forth in Amaya.
Everyone of the arguments advanced in
today's opinion was considered by this
court and rejected, expressly or by fair
implication, in Amaya. l
Further, as
dismissed the action. The Court of Appeal reversed, and in its opinion pronounced the doctrine that is revived in
the majority opinion here.
(See Cnl.
App., 23 Cal.Rptr. 131.) Upon petition
this court granted a hearing, thereby nul-
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Amaya points out (p. 304 of 59 Cal.2d,
29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513), in every
jurisdiction-:in this country that had ruled
on the point at issue the decisions up to
that time (1963) were unanimous in upholding the rule of nonliability.
~/
So far as has been discovered, jn~~t a
single such jurisdiction has an appellate
court rule to the contrary since Amaya.2
But the majority make no attempt in today's opinion-as apparently they could
not-to buttress their result with citations
of cases based on American law, to say
nothing of that of California. Instead, we
are offered two English cases applying the
1925 Hambrook case (Hambrook v. Stokes
Bros. [1925] I K.B. 141), whose ruling we
expressly rejected in Amaya (pp. 303-304
[fn. 4], and 313, of 59 Cal.2d, 29 Cal.Rptr.
33, 379 P.2d 513), and which, as already
stated has not been followed or approved
by any jurisdiction in this country.

The majority; obviously recognizing that
they are now embarking upon a first excursion into the "fantastic realm of infinite liability" (Amaya, at p. 315 of 59
Cal.2d, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513),
undertake to provide so-called "guidelines"
"for the future. But notwithstanding the
limitations which these "guidelines" purport to impose, it is only reasonable to expect pressure upon our trial courts to make
their future rulings conform to the spirit
of the new elasticity proclaimed by the
majority.
Moreover, the majority's "guidelines"
(ante, 441 P.2d pp. 920, 921) are simply a
Jifying the Court of Appeal opinion. Our
opinion affirmed the trial court.
2. The courts of two states have expressly
denied recovery: see Barber v. Pollock
(1963) 104 N.H. 379, 187 A.2d 788 (wife
witnessed from inside the house an accident in which her husband was killed);
Jelley v. LaFlame (N.H.1968) 238 A.2d
728 (mother standing on side of highway
witnessed an accident in which he'r 6year-old daughter, who had alighted from
a school bus, was crushed to dca th by; a
truck); Knaub v. Gotwalt (1066) 422
Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646, in which the court
expressly rejected even the "impact"

restatement of those suggested earlier by
Professor Prosser (Prosser, Tort's, 2d ed.,
1955, p. 182); they have already been discussed and expressly rejected by this court
in Amaya (pp. 312-313, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33,
379 P.2d 513). Upon analysis, their seeming certainty evaporates into arbitrariness,
an inexplicable distinctions appear.3 As
we asked in Amaya: What if the plaintiff was honestly mistaken in believing
the third person to be in danger or to be
seriously injured? What if the third person had assumed the risk involved? How
"close" must the relationship/ be between
the plaintiff and the third person? I. e.,
what if the third person was the plaintiff's beloved niece or nephew, grandparent, fiance, or lifelong friend, more
dear to the plaintiff than her immediate
family? Next, how "near" must the plaintiff have been to the scene of t~e accident, and how "soon" must shock have
been felt? Indeed, what is the magic in
the plaintiff's being actually present? Is
the shock any less real if the mother does
not know of the accident until her injured
child is brought into her home? On the
other hand, is it any less real if the mother
is physically present at the scene but is
nevertheless unaware of the danger or injury to her child until after the accident
has occurred? No answers to these questions are to be found in today's majority
opinion. Our trial courts, however, will
not so easily escape the burden of distinguishing between litigants on the basis of
such artificial and unpredictable distinctions.
rule and notcd that, as shown in 1S
A.L.R.2d 220, virtually no jurisdiction
permits recovery to a mere witness not
in the zone of danger.
3. Thus the Supreme Court of New Ramp·
shire has recently recognized that to approve recovery by mothers of small chi!·
dren, as do the majority here, would cre·
ate "the need '" '" '" to impose arbi·
trnry and illogical limitations to preven t
the undue extension of the liability of an
alleged negligent operator such as-the defendant in this casc." (Jelley v. LaFlame
(1968) supra, 238 A.2d 728, 730.)

======~----- ...... --.
DILLON v. LEGG

Cal.

927

CIte as 441 P.2d 912

Further, and again contrary to the assertions of the majority (ante, 441 P.2d
pp. 915, 916), no fallacy or incongruity appears in the rute permitting recovery to
one within the physical zone of danger for
trauma suffered from fear of impact, but
denying it to a person outside that zone.
The impact feared must be to oneself; and
it must be an objective fear-not merely
that of an excessively imaginative or timid
plaintiff. As pointed out in the leading
case of Waube v. Warrington (1935) 216
Wis. 603, 612-6\3, 258 N.W. 497, 500501, HIt is one thing to say that as to
those who are put in peril of physical impact, impact is immaterial if phfsical injury is caused by shock arising from the
peril. It is the foundation of cases holding to this liberal ruling, that the person
affrighted or sustaining shock was actually put in peril of physical impact, and
under these conditions it was considered
immaterial that the physical impact did
not materialize. It is quite another thing
to say that those who are out of the field
of physical danger through impact -shall
have a legally protected right---to be free
from emotional distress occasioned by the
peril of others, when that distress results
in physical impairment." (Italics added.)
Thus, California's rule that a plaintiff's
reasonable fear for his own safety is compensable presents neither an argument for
the same rule as to fear for others, nor a
danger of recovery based on the plaintiff's
false claims of fear for himself.4
The assertion of the majority (ante, 441
P .2d p. 917) that "The denial of 'duty' in
the instant situation [i. e., physical im4. Contrary to the assertion of the majority (ante, 441 P.2d p. 924), no California case has held that "a mother could
recover for fear for her children's safety
if she simultaneously entertained n personal fear for herself." As correctly
stated in Amaya (p. 300 of 59 Ca1.2d, 29

Cnl.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513), Lindley v.
Knowlton (1918) 179 Cnl. 298, 176 P.
440, hel(I only thnt linbility may be predicated upon fright and consequent illness
induced by the plaintiff's remwnnble fenr
for her oum safety, even 1vhen the plnintiff mny nlso have feared for the safety

pairment resulting from emotional distress occasioned by apprehension of the
peril of others] rests upon the prime hypothesis that allowance of sU'ch an action
would lead to successful assertion of fraudulent claims," (italics added) is controverted by the very case cited in support.
(Waube v. Warrington, supra, 216 Wis.
603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, SOl.) Instead of
reliance on any such "prime hypothesis,"
the Wisconsin court had this to say in
WaH-be: "The answer to this question cannot be reached solely by logic, nor is· it
clear that" 1t can be entirely disposed of
by a consideration of what the defendant
ought reasonably to have anticipated as a
consequence of his wrong. The answer
must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain how
far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right
may justly and expediently be extended.
It is our conclusion that they can neither
justly nor expediently be extended to any
recovery for physical injuries sustained
by one out of the range of ordinary physical peril as a result of the shock of witnessing another's danger. Such consequences are so unusual and extraordinary,
viewed after the event, that a user of the
highway may be said not to subject others
to an unreasonable risk of them by the
careless management of his vehicle. Furthermore, the liability imposed by such a
doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the
culpability of the negligent tort-feasor,would put an unreasonable burden upon
users of the highway, open the way to
fraudulent claims, and enter a field that
has no sensible or just stopping point."
of her children. And as likewise correctly stated in Amaya (p. 302, 29 Cal.Rptr.
33, 379 P.2d 513), the holding in, Reed v.
Moore (1957) 156 Cal.Apl).2d 43, 47,
319 P.2d 80, was that a wife who wns
outside the zone of danger but witnessed
a collision in which her husband was injured C!ould not recover. Neither Lindlev
nor Reed holds, or even suggests, thnt a
plninHff mny recover for fear for the
safety of nnother if she cnn estnblish
that she herself was in the zone of
danger.
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As this court declared in Amaya (p. 315
of 59 Ca1.2d p. 45 of 29 Cal.Rptr., p. 529
of 379 P.2d) , there is good sense in the
conclusion of the court in Waube that
lithe liability imposed by such a doctrine

is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor"; further, to permit recovery by e"very person
who might adversely feel some lingering
effect of the defendant's conduct would
throw 11S into "the fantastic realm of infinite liability." Yet the majority opinion
in the present case simply omits to either
mention or discuss the injustice to California defendants flowing from such a
disproportionate extension of their liability
-an injustice which plainly constituted a
"prime hypothesis" for rejection of the

dertaken to change the law we there declared. We may presume, therefore, that
the limitations upon liability there affirmed
comport with legislative views. But if all
alleged California tortfeasors, including
motorists, home and other property owners, and governmental entities, are, now
to be faced with the concept of potentially
infinite liability beyond any rational relationship to their culpability, then surely
the point has been reached at which. the
Legislature should reconsider the entire
subject and alIow all interests affected to

be heard.
I would affirm the judgment.
McCOMB,

J.,

concurs,

liability sought to be imposed by the plaintiffs in Waube and in Amaya..

(See also

Jelley v. LaFlame (N.H.1968) supra, 238
A.2d 728, 730, citing with approval and following this ground of decision expressed
in Waube and in Amaya.)
Additionally, the majority fail to explain
their bare assertion (ante, 441 P.2d p.
916) that contributory negligence of Erin
will defeat any recovery by plaintiff mother and sister.ls The familiar and heretofore
unquestioned principle is that the relation-

ships of parent and child or of husband
and wife in themselves furnish no basis
for imputation of. contributory negligence.
(Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law, Torts, §
341, p. 1542; Rest., Torts 2d, § 488.) Is
this principle now abrogated in California?
If so, it is a ruling extending far beyond
the confines of the particular issue now
before us, and reaches potentially every
negligence action in which the plaintiffs
are members of the same family.

It appears to me that in the light of
today's majority opinion the matter at
issue should be commended to the attention of the Legislature of this state. Five
years have elapsed since our Amaya decision, during which that body has not un5. Neither does the majority opinion enlighten us as to how the contributory
negligence of either (a) plaintiff mother

o
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Ernest 'J. ZEMKE, Petitioner,
Y.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEALS

BOARD, W. S. Sham ban and Com ..
pany, et al., Respondents.

L. A. 29533.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank.

June 28, 1968.

Workmen's compensation case wherein
review was sought of Appeals Board's opinion and order denying reconsideration of
its prior apportionment. The Supreme

Court, Tobriner, J., held that finding that
50% of petitioner's permanent disability
was attributable to his preexisting asymptomatic arthritic condition was not supported by substantial evidence.
Annulled and remanded.
or (b) plaintiff sister will 8ssertedIy defent nny recovery by the other,

